

case 6-472-935
January 18, 2021

Köprü: A Culinary Entrepreneur Incubation Program Aims for Sustainability to Address Humanitarian Challenges in Turkey

In early 2020 Emine, the executive director of Ulkayo,ⁱ a nonprofit based in Istanbul, Turkey, weighed her staff's proposals for new revenue streams for the Köprü program. Köprü was an entrepreneur incubation program that provided support to refugees and members of the Turkish host community who sought to build and scale food businesses, and simultaneously promoted social cohesion among them. The program was launched with three years of seed funding from the U.S. government to create a food incubator, called the Food Enterprise Center (FEC), with the Köprü program housed within it. With the initial investment term ending at the end of the calendar year, Ulkayo needed to rethink its business model to sustain the program.

Operating since 2011, Ulkayo was a well-established non-governmental organization (NGO) in the international development sector. The Köprü program had been established only two years earlier with funding and technical support from the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), a business-oriented NGO based in the United States that supported democracy through private enterprise and market-oriented reform. The program was implemented in collaboration with other U.S.-based resource partners including a successful (and self-sustaining) food incubator and an institute at a leading public university committed to economic and social development through thriving business. Each partner brought a unique set of capabilities to build a first-of-its kind program to support and encourage entrepreneurship, job creation, and cross-cultural engagement in the food sector.

Ulkayo was responsible for implementing the many aspects of the Köprü program and managing the daily operations of the FEC, which included a commercial kitchen, training and coworking space, and staff offices. Since it was now the third and final year of the seed grant, Ulkayo needed to revisit the program design and plan for a financially sustainable business model to ensure the Köprü program could continue.

Ulkayo could consider a range of options to achieve financial sustainability, such as establishing new, varied revenue streams, which could include charging for products and services, or securing grant funds from other funders such as corporations or international donors. The day-to-day demands of running the FEC, in addition to overseeing a full portfolio of other development programs, left little time for Emine to develop

ⁱ Ulkayo is a fictional organization.

Published by WDI Publishing, a division of the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan.

© 2021 Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). This case was written by Cassandra Pagan Araujo on behalf of CIPE, with contributions from Marie Principe of CIPE, and Amy Gillett and Kristin Babbie Kelterborn, both of the Entrepreneurship Development Center at the William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan. The case was prepared as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a situation. The case should not be considered criticism or endorsement and should not be used as a source of primary data.

The entrepreneur incubation program was the cornerstone of Köprü's effort to build sustainable livelihoods and foster social cohesion through food. The program was designed to expand entrepreneurial skills, deepen knowledge of local regulations, and build cross-cultural understanding to position entrepreneurs for success in the food industry. Throughout the four-month incubation period, training and support services were offered in both Turkish and Arabic, opening opportunities for entrepreneurs from a range of cultural backgrounds and nationalities. The Köprü curriculum was carefully designed, curated, and localized to ensure entrepreneurs received the best guidance suited for their skill level and business type. The curriculum included 25 modules of specialized content and covered 60 hours of instruction on the principles of entrepreneurship, finances, marketing, business negotiations, and legal and compliance requirements, among other subjects. Entrepreneurs were also trained on topics such as food safety. Each cohort committed to 12 weeks of instruction led by qualified trainers from the business community and academia. Satisfactory completion of the training program was a condition of each member's graduation from the incubator and participation in the business pitch competition.

and execute revenue-generating activities despite the ongoing inputs from CIPE and the other partners in planning for financial sustainability. Without a new financial plan, the Köprü program would be forced to close the FEC to aspiring Syrian and Turkish food entrepreneurs the following year. Emine was looking for sustainable business solutions that could support the program well into the future.

Emine planned to meet with three members of her staff to discuss the challenge of making the program financially sustainable beyond the seed grant. They decided to meet in the cafe of the FEC and exchange ideas over coffee.

A Plan for Sustainability

Emine was a business-savvy social entrepreneur who recognized the importance of both social impact and financial sustainability. She also believed in applying market-based approachesⁱⁱ to address development and humanitarian issues. An Istanbul native, she had a strong grasp of both the local context and the broad challenges in responding to Turkey's refugee crisis. With a degree in business, a certificate in entrepreneurial leadership, and previous experience with a well-known international humanitarian aid organization, Emine's professional path blurred the distinction between the business and humanitarian spaces. As the founder of the Köprü program, her approach to implementation reflected

her experience. She was keen to preserve the program's focus on supporting refugees and the Turkish host community to promote long-term solutions to creating livelihoods while also generating revenue streams to support the operating costs of the program. She also recognized that without a plan for sustainability and a new business model for the program, the organization itself would be in a precarious financial situation by 2021. She worried about donor fatigue five years into the refugee crisis and the relatively high cost-per-participant of the Köprü program, which made it harder to convince donors of its long-term value. She thought to herself, "There has to be a way to do it all." (See **Exhibit 1** for a detailing of Köprü's costs.)

While Emine was preparing coffee in the kitchen of the FEC, her staff arrived and each was prepared to pitch an approach to sustaining the Köprü program beyond the seed grant. Each staff member—Khaled, Tutku, and Arif—was responsible for managing essential aspects of the program, or Ulkayo overall, and

ii The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation provides this definition: "In the market creation approach to development there are three key elements: a) need-based product development, for products with a high impact on poverty alleviation, putting the accent on affordability and high returns on investment; b) the promotion and marketing of these products so that the poor can learn about their existence; and c) the creation of a market for these products to the extent that it becomes viable for the private sector to deliver these products as a business." For more information visit: <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Poverty-alleviation-as-a-business-%3A-the-market-to-%3A-Heierli-Polak/e05b60be532deae0a1b5cc0d8c88a625270cf5eb>.

brought unique experience to the table when challenged by Emine to consider how the program could remain financially viable. (See **Exhibit 2** for brief profiles of the four Ulkayo employees.)

Khaled's role as Köprü training manager primarily focused on implementing the program's entrepreneurship training component and he spent most of his time interacting directly with the trainers and entrepreneurs of both the refugee and the host communities. Khaled also engaged with alumni on a regular basis and was attuned to the needs of the program's graduates and current members alike.

Tutku, a big-picture thinker, was an entrepreneur herself. At Ulkayo, she acted in a mid-level managerial role as the Köprü incubator manager, supervising day-to-day activities of the program including providing financial and programmatic oversight and working with local partners to strengthen the program's offerings and serving as the liaison between Ulkayo and the U.S.-based resource partners. She had learned much about managing a food incubator from the U.S.-based food incubator partner, whose operations were sustained by revenue generated by their core business, and she was eager to road-test those ideas.

Arif's role as Ulkayo's chief financial officer built on his previous experience as an accountant. While Arif provided some legal and accounting support to members at Tutku's request, he was particularly concerned with the overall financial health and sustainability of Ulkayo and wasn't convinced that the organization's future had to involve the Köprü program.

Emine returned with a fresh, steaming brew of coffee and some sweets from one of the Köprü entrepreneurs who was testing out a new recipe in the kitchen. The group was now ready to dig into the topic at hand.

Tutku pulled out a blank PESTLEⁱⁱⁱ analysis template and said, "Before we get into our proposals, I want to review this framework." Tutku had previously participated in the Chobani Incubator program—a food enterprise incubator with a focus on social impact operated by the U.S.-based Greek yogurt company—and often applied the tools she had learned to her current work on the Köprü program. After walking the group through the basics of the PESTLE framework, Tutku homed in on the political, social, and legal constraints facing the program. First, she explained that a non-profit organization such as Ulkayo, with its current registration status, could not take equity in members' ventures nor accept investor capital. Second, she shared that Syrian members struggled to grow their businesses due to lack of access to capital; 80% of Syrian enterprises in Turkey reported challenges in access to finance and only 1% of Syrian-owned small and medium enterprises reported having received a formal loan.¹ Tutku proposed turning the food entrepreneur incubation program into a separate for-profit entity that could accept investor capital to sustain the program and, in turn, create a fund to provide capital for members. As a new entity, the commercial kitchen could be monetized by renting the space to corporations for events, and a membership fee structure for participating entrepreneurs could be implemented. Tutku proposed that to maintain the focus on serving the refugee population, those who qualified could receive a discount or scholarship, while those not financially constrained would pay full price. Tutku also suggested establishing Köprü as a social cooperative, a structure that would allow it to combine capital, make investments, and generate a return under the cooperative.² "This project is complicated, and no solution will come easily. Let's think a little differently than we're used to and not be afraid to take risks!" she said.

Khaled was skeptical of Tutku's proposal. He had previously worked with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and had connections in the international donor community. These experiences honed his skills as an empathetic and effective trainer for the members of the entrepreneurship

iii PESTLE analysis monitors and analyzes macro-environmental factors that can have an effect on an organization. In the acronym, P stands for political, E for economic, S for social, T for technological, L for legal, and E for environment (see **Exhibit 3**).

incubation program, particularly those representing the refugee community. Confident that the program would generate interest from the international donor community, Khaled approached the sustainability challenge with an “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it” attitude. He was concerned with how monetizing the training or renting the commercial kitchen would impact the focus on serving refugees who might not be able to pay a membership fee. Similarly, he feared less-privileged members would lose access to the kitchen in favor of wealthier members, with the potential to favor the Turkish community. To preserve what Khaled felt was the essence of the program, he proposed pursuing grant funding from international development donors interested in addressing refugee livelihoods. “We have reached so many refugees through our program and have come very far. Why not focus our efforts on generating more funding from donors? This program is unique and I know that other organizations would fund a program like ours. Our members are counting on us.” (See **Exhibit 4** for donor funding trends.)

Arif had been with Ulkayo since its founding and was concerned about the high cost of running Köprü. Ulkayo had used a significant portion of the seed grant to rent and remodel the FEC that spanned 1,200 square meters over four floors. Running a food entrepreneurship incubation program required maintaining a commercial grade kitchen with cold and dry food storage and a full-time chef, classrooms, staff offices, and a coworking space, all resulting in high fixed costs compared to other programs Ulkayo had managed. To illustrate his point, Arif pulled from his bag a copy of the business model canvas (BMC) the team had prepared in the first year of the program with guidance from CIPE (see **Exhibit 5**) and directed the group’s attention to the cost structure and revenue models. Referring to the template often used for developing new business models, he pointed out, “The program just isn’t set up to generate revenue. We have accomplished what we set out to do for the donor, but beyond that we should consider abandoning the Köprü program and look for new ways to use the facility and expertise we’ve developed. We have to take care of the employees of Ulkayo and keep everyone employed. I know there is interest in coworking spaces and we could rent the facility for corporate events and catering.”

Köprü Program in Context

Twin Crises in Turkey

According to the UNHCR, a record 79.5 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced by events such as war, conflict, persecution, and human rights violations by the end of 2019.³ Once people were forced to leave, it could be a long time before they were able to return. The average duration of exile for refugees in 2015 was 10.3 years and the median was 4 years.⁴ Of the 6.6 million Syrians who have been displaced by Syrian civil conflict since 2011, about 3.6 million were in Turkey. The country hosted the largest number of people displaced across borders⁵ in part due to its geographic proximity to the Syrian conflict and its historic position as the gateway to Europe since the days of the Silk Road.

Turkey faced challenges in addition to the Syrian refugee crisis. In the first eight months of 2018, the Turkish lira fell by 40% against the U.S. dollar, signaling a currency crisis from which Turkey had not recovered as of 2020.⁶ During this time, food prices were especially impacted, with the average cost of popular produce rising 31% in a single month. The convergence of the influx of refugees since 2011 and mounting economic troubles sowed resentment among the host population, at times sparking hostility toward Syrians living in Turkey. A survey found that 60% of Turkish respondents would not want to live in the same building as a Syrian and 56% would avoid working with a Syrian.⁷

Refugee Livelihoods and the Culinary Sector in Turkey

Out of more than one million eligible Syrians, only about 60,000 work authorizations were granted through 2018. As a result, between 750,000 to 1.3 million Syrians worked in Turkey’s already-crowded

informal sector.⁸ Syrians and other refugees faced barriers to formal employment and starting businesses because they often lacked job training, knowledge of the Turkish business environment, and Turkish language skills. But these challenges were not unique to the Syrian population; almost ten percent of refugees in Turkey were non-Syrian. These refugees, mainly Iraqis and Afghans, faced similar challenges but were unable to access humanitarian support and services afforded to Syrians.⁹

The Turkish food sector provided opportunities for starting small businesses. Despite recent economic troubles, the food retail sector in Turkey was still predicted to grow.¹⁰ Istanbul was known as a culinary hub and 43% of the income in Turkey's hospitality and restaurant industry was generated in Istanbul.¹¹ While it could be problematic for refugees to obtain work permits to be hired in the food sector, it was relatively easy to establish their own food businesses in accordance with Turkish law. Once an entrepreneur had established a business with the proper permitting, the business owner could then apply for a work permit.¹²

Emine believed that entrepreneurship programs were a viable and durable solution to the gaps in the response to the refugee crisis. The Köprü program established the first food incubator in Turkey, offering unmatched facilities, support services, and an expertly designed curriculum that enhanced livelihoods and encouraged innovation and collaboration among groups, while simultaneously building social cohesion and creating a more dynamic and constructive business environment.

Köprü Program's Evolution

The first phase of the Köprü program introduced an innovative approach to providing support to refugee and host communities in the midst of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. The establishment of the FEC in Turkey, a comprehensive entrepreneur incubation experience, workforce development program, the practice of gastrodiplomacy, and publication of a cookbook were key accomplishments in the first two years.

From late 2017 through the end of 2019, 251 people (69% women and 31% men; 56% Syrian, 31% Turkish and 12% of other national origin), referred to as "members," graduated from the Köprü entrepreneur incubation program. Most of the members were Turkish and Syrian women ages 35-45, and the majority entered the entrepreneur incubation program in the idea stage of their venture. The members' backgrounds ranged across socio-economic lines, and patterns evolved as the program tapped into different segments. The earlier cohorts attracted members with limited professional or entrepreneurial experience and education, many of them Syrian women whose experience was primarily related to homemaking. Later cohorts attracted more members who had established careers and were better-connected in their communities, Turkish and Syrian alike. When the Köprü program began, Ulkayo relied on other NGOs serving refugees, as well as social media, to recruit cohorts for the entrepreneurship training program. As the Köprü program's reputation grew in Turkey, the final cohorts were recruited mainly from word of mouth and personal recommendations. (See **Exhibit 6** for member statistics.)

After graduating from the incubation program, members completed a post-training evaluation survey. More than half the members reported improved business skills essential to entrepreneurship, such as finding business partners and customers (59%), designing a business model (57%), and marketing a food-based product or service (58%). Close to a third of members reported improved personal skills in areas like speaking in public on any topic (29%), making decisions when you don't have all the answers (35%), and introducing yourself to someone you do not know (37%). These personal skills were particularly valuable for refugees establishing livelihoods and becoming integrated in a host community. When members were asked about their one-year journey to grow their businesses, more than half claimed increased ability to license their business legally in Turkey (57%). More than 50% felt better positioned to start or grow a food-based

business that would earn a profit. Emine saw these data as evidence the program was working and would continue to be successful.

Food Enterprise Center (FEC)

In the early days of the program, Ulkayo knew it would have to expand into a larger space to house the facilities required to run a food incubator. Representatives from CIPE and the other U.S.-based resource partners travelled to Turkey to provide technical expertise regarding design and construction of the FEC, particularly the commercial kitchen (see **Exhibit 7**). Despite concerns that the space might be more than the program required, Ulkayo ultimately chose to rent and remodel a four-floor, 1,200-square-meter facility within the burgeoning innovation and startup scene in Istanbul. Using the seed grant funds from the U.S. government, Ulkayo created a state-of-the-art commercial kitchen with multiple workstations. Ulkayo purchased grills, cooktops, fryers, ovens, refrigerators, sinks, prep stations, and dry and cold storage, and added a cleaning area and cafe seating. The facility included training and event space, coworking space, and staff offices. The open and inviting floor plan and stylish decor (see **Exhibit 8**) gave the program credibility and offered high-quality shared resources that could help entrepreneurs reduce their startup costs. While the use of the facility was free for members and alumni of the entrepreneur incubation program during the grant, the vision for the FEC was that it could serve as a multi-use facility for revenue-generating activities beyond and in addition to U.S. government funds.

Entrepreneur Incubation Program

The entrepreneurship incubation program, the signature component of Köprü, consisted of four months of training grounded in curriculum developed by Ulkayo and the U.S.-based university partner and customized for food entrepreneurs in the Turkish market. The curriculum included a workbook that prompted members to price products, determine profit margins, create mission statements, and complete other necessary steps to establish and grow their businesses. Each offering of the program culminated in a business pitch competition (BPC) where members described their businesses to a jury of experts for an opportunity to receive seed award funding. The entrepreneur incubation program also offered business support services including special workshops and individual coaching sessions on topics such as legal issues, accounting, social media strategies, and packaging and product optimization. After graduating from the entrepreneurship incubation program, members continued to attend workshops and coaching sessions as part of the follow-on support provided to program alumni. The program held more than 40 workshops in these key areas of business support from the beginning of 2018 to the end of 2019.

Recognizing the range of needs for the target audience, Ulkayo planned to diversify program offerings and developed a fast-track curriculum for advanced entrepreneurs that would be introduced in June 2020. Lasting a month, this curriculum would still target a mix of Turkish and Syrian/refugee cohorts but would charge a membership fee, unlike the core entrepreneurship incubation program. There was fierce debate among Ulkayo staff regarding the pricing of this service and how to ensure access to less-resourced members of the community.

Responsive to the needs of members outside the curriculum, Ulkayo was also working with CIPE and its U.S.-based partners to expand business support service offerings. These included a series of videos on food sector-specific topics to help entrepreneurs such as building supplier directories, pricing models, packaging, branding and design, how to get licensed, and digital marketing. These tools would also be implemented in 2020. Emine anticipated that these resources would build the in-house expertise and credibility of the Köprü program team, in addition to supporting members in their business aspirations. In recent discussions, Tutku had suggested monetizing the expanded business support services.

Workforce Development Program

The workforce development program was designed to enhance employability among the target population and allowed food sector workers to gain a variety of vocational skills that were advantageous in food enterprises. Ulkayo decided that the most valuable training to offer participants would be a Ministry of National Education certified training required for anyone handling food in Turkey. Within two years, 1,017 participants received training and certification in food safety. This certification improved the employability of food sector workers and protected food business owners by ensuring compliance with local regulations. It also provided a job-matching opportunity between certified food sector workers and members of the entrepreneurship incubation program.

By January 2020, the Köprü program team was being approached by restaurants looking to comply with local regulations by ensuring their employees were certified in food sanitation. The program was offered at no cost to participants. Restaurant owners encouraged several peers to certify their staffs, and the popularity of the program exploded. This surge in demand further strengthened the program's credibility among food entrepreneurs in Turkey and supported business resiliency within the food industry.

Gastrodiplomacy and Social Cohesion

Gastrodiplomacy, the practice of creating and strengthening social bonds through the sharing of food, was woven through all of Köprü's activities. Although negative sentiment toward refugees in Turkey grew as the refugee crisis continued, Ulkayo witnessed Turkish and Syrian members create social ties through their participation in the incubation program and while cooking together in the kitchen. Ulkayo often reported that members approached them at the beginning of the program to express their hesitancy about training with a diverse population. However, by the end of the program, Turkish and Syrian members cheered one another on in business pitch competitions, supported each other's businesses, and maintained friendly and professional relationships despite language and cultural barriers. In some cases, members of different backgrounds decided to collaborate with or hire each other.

The practice of gastrodiplomacy culminated with the publication of the Köprü program cookbook that combined short essays about the special role of food in building community and recipes from 24 members. As of December 31, 2019, presales of the cookbook had generated \$6,000 for the Köprü program.

The Köprü program itself had successfully evolved from the idea stage to the startup stage because Ulkayo had the right partners and people to realize the vision and was looking forward to entering the growth stage of its development. Emine knew Ulkayo had a valuable facility and the program had several revenue streams in nascent stages or program components with the potential to generate revenue.

Evaluating Next Steps

The meeting ended and Emine returned to her office to consider the ideas her staff had proposed and chart a path forward. Knowing she had challenging decisions to make regarding the future of Köprü and its role within Ulkayo, she reviewed the program's original BMC that CIPE had helped Ulkayo develop at the program's outset. With the BMC and PESTLE framework Tutku had introduced in hand, she was immensely proud of how much the Köprü program had accomplished in just two years. While the path to financial sustainability beyond the grant was uncertain, she was confident in her team's ability to find the right solutions.

Exhibits

Exhibit 1 Annual Costs of the Köprü Program

OPERATING COSTS				
	Unit Type (month/ hour/lump etc)	Number of Units	Unit cost	Total Cost
PERSONNEL				
Executive Director	monthly	12	\$4,000	\$48,000
Chief Financial Officer	monthly	12	\$3,000	\$36,000
Incubation Manager	monthly	12	\$2,000	\$24,000
Kitchen Manager	monthly	12	\$2,000	\$24,000
Training Manager	monthly	12	\$1,000	\$12,000
Member Services Coordinator	monthly	12	\$1,000	\$12,000
Trainers (2)	monthly	12	\$1,600	\$19,200
<i>subtotal</i>				\$175,200
CONTRACTUAL				
Marketing & Communication	monthly	12	\$1,400	\$16,800
Kitchen Hygiene Certification and Audit	yearly	1	\$1,200	\$1,200
<i>subtotal</i>				\$18,000
OTHER DIRECT COSTS				
Rent, Food Enterprise Center	monthly	12	\$3,500	\$42,000
Utilities, Food Enterprise Center	monthly	12	\$1,000	\$12,000
Insurance, Food Enterprise Center	yearly	1	\$400	\$400
Communications/ Postage	monthly	12	\$400	\$4,800
Translation services	yearly	1	\$8,000	\$8,000
<i>subtotal</i>				\$67,200
Total Project Costs				\$260,400
Overhead (20%)				\$52,080
TOTAL				\$312,480

Source: Created by the case author.

Exhibits (cont.)

Exhibit 2
Profiles of Four Ulkayo Employees

Name	Role	Description
Emine	Executive director, Ulkayo and founder of the Köprü program	<p>Turkish nationality with experience working with the refugee community and degrees in international affairs and management, certificate in entrepreneurial leadership.</p> <p>“A business-minded social entrepreneur,” impactful, practical, and grounded, she believes entrepreneurship is a way to build sustainable livelihoods for people and that the program can find ways to sustain itself. Her approach: Preserve the focus on serving refugees/vulnerable communities and the host community to build social cohesion while generating new revenue streams.</p>
Khaled	Köprü training manager	<p>Lebanese nationality, humanitarian assistance professional background and degrees in international development and political science.</p> <p>Empathetic and has built personal relationships with many of the members he has trained in the program. Believes that providing sustainable livelihoods for vulnerable groups is critical but is concerned that a focus on generating revenue may mean that there is less of a focus on the communities served.</p> <p>His approach: Pursue donor funding to keep the project going without compromising the spirit of the program.</p> <p>“We have reached so many refugees through our program and have come very far. Why not focus our efforts on generating more funding from donors? This project is unique and I know that other organizations would fund a project like ours. Our members are counting on us.”</p>
Tutku	Köprü incubation manager	<p>Dual Turkish and Syrian nationality. Experience in humanitarian work but also an entrepreneur herself and seeks to implement the program with a balance. Has connections with Syrian investors who have expressed early interest in funding the project as well as individual entrepreneurs and companies in the food industry.</p> <p>Her approach: Break the project into a separate for-profit entity that can accept investor capital; has even expressed interest in running or co-running this new entity.</p> <p>“This project is complicated, and no solution will come easily. Let’s think a little differently than we’re used to and not be afraid to take risks!” Introduced the PESTLE framework and suggests Emine consider these dimensions in her planning.</p>

Exhibits (cont.)

Exhibit 2 (cont.)
Profiles of Four Ulkayo Employees

Name	Role	Description
Arif	Chief financial officer, Ulkayo	<p>Turkish nationality. Former accountant and longtime friend of Emine. Admires her vision but is very practical and is primarily concerned with the financial health of Ulkayo overall since he has been involved with the organization for a long time.</p> <p>Introduces the BMC to the group, encouraging Emine to think critically about the cost structure of the program. He is not convinced the program is in a position to generate sufficient revenue to support operating costs.</p> <p>His approach: Believes that the group should “go back to the drawing board” and that any component of the program could be sacrificed so long as the organization itself remains viable.</p> <p>“The program just isn’t set up to generate revenue. Let’s think completely outside the box, even if it means abandoning the original mission of the program. We have accomplished what we set out to do for the donor, but beyond that we should consider abandoning the Köprü program and look for new ways to use the facility and expertise we’ve developed. I know there is interest in coworking spaces and we could rent the facility for corporate events and catering.”</p>

Source: Created by the case author.

Exhibits (cont.)


Exhibit 3
PESTLE Framework Guiding Questions

Political: What is the political situation of the country and how can it affect the industry?
 Economic: What are the prevalent economic factors?
 Social: How much importance does culture have in the market and what are its determinants?
 Technological: What technological innovations are likely to pop up and affect the market structure?
 Legal: What are the government regulations in the industry and how likely are they to change?
 Environmental: What are the environmental concerns for the industry?

Source: "What is PESTLE Analysis? An Important Business Analysis Tool." *PESTLEAnalysis.com*. <https://pestleanalysis.com/what-is-pestle-analysis/>.

Exhibit 4
Donor Funding Trends

Figure 2.6
Growth from Middle East and North of Sahara outstrips contraction elsewhere
International humanitarian assistance from governments by donor region, 2009–2018



In 2018 there were notable variations in the volume of assistance from different regions. Funding from governments in Europe and North and Central America fell while assistance from the Middle East and North of Sahara rose sharply.

- In 2018, combined bilateral contributions from European governments and EU institutions fell by 9%, the first fall since 2012. Assistance from Europe reduced from US\$11.7 billion in 2017 to US\$10.6 billion in 2018, making up 47% of total bilateral assistance.
- Driving this decrease were falls of 11% from Germany (from US\$3.3 billion to US\$3.0 billion) and the UK (US\$2.5 billion to US\$2.2 billion); the first decreases since 2012.
- The volume of bilateral international humanitarian assistance provided by countries in North and Central America also decreased, falling from US\$7.8 billion in 2017 to \$7.4 billion in 2018.
- Contributions from the US and Canada fell in 2018 by 6% and 3%, respectively, to US\$6.6 billion and US\$711 million. However, assistance from these two countries has grown markedly over the past decade, increasing by 33% and 106%, respectively, since 2009.

Source: "Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019." *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2019>.

Exhibits (cont.)



Exhibit 5
Business Model Canvas, Partially Completed by Ulkayo Team

The Business Model Canvas		Designed for: Ulkayo	Designed by: Arif	On: October 2018 Revision # 1
Key Partners <small>Who are our Key Partners? Who are our key suppliers? Which Key Resources are we acquiring from partners? Which Key Activities do partners perform?</small> For the incubator: -Foundations -Donors -Regulators -Investor groups -Kitchen manufacturers -Advertising agencies -Universities -Government agencies -ISKUR (Turkish Employment Agency) -NGOs	Key Activities <small>What Key Activities do our Value Propositions require? Our Distribution Channels? Customer Relationships? Revenue streams?</small> -Training -Networking events -Mentorship program -Workshops -Gastrodiplomacy events -Success story /entrepreneurship events -Bus. Plan competition -Demo days -Outreach	Value Propositions <small>What value do we deliver to the customer? Which one of our customer's problems are we helping to solve? What Bundles of products and services are we offering to each Customer Segment? Which customer needs are we satisfying?</small> -Sales opportunities -Product development -Help them become food entrepreneurs -Build self confidence -Improve management skills -Prestige -Sales distribution channels -Mentors -Marketplace -Experts -Space -Branding -Network -Community -Legal know-how -Kitchen equipment -Regulations know-how -Trainings -Marketing -Location -Availability -Seed funding -Professional and personal development -Social cohesion	Customer Relationships <small>What type of relationship does each of our Customer Segments expect us to establish and maintain with them? Which ones have we established? How are they integrated with the rest of our business model? How costly are they?</small> Media -Food fairs -Gastrodiplomacy events -Community centers -Public training centers -Social media -Iftar invitations -Franchise -Start-up events -Bloggers	Customer Segments <small>For whom are we creating value? Who are our most important customers?</small> -Syrian refugees -Other refugees -Turkish entrepreneurs -Food entrepreneurs -Women -Food professionals w/out entrepreneurship -Youth -Gastronomy students -Existing and future entrepreneurs
	Key Resources <small>What Key Resources do our Value Propositions require? Our Distribution Channels? Customer Relationships? Revenue Streams?</small> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> What about resources?? </div>	Channels <small>Through which Channels do our Customer Segments want to be reached? How are we reaching them now? How are our Channels integrated? Which ones work best? Which ones are most cost-efficient? How are we integrating them with customer routines?</small> On-site <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> Are our only channels on-site? </div>		
Cost Structure <small>What are the most important costs inherent in our business model? Which Key Resources are most expensive? Which Key Activities are most expensive?</small> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> What about costs?? </div>		Revenue Streams <small>For what value are our customers really willing to pay? For what do they currently pay? How are they currently paying? How would they prefer to pay? How much does each channel/consumer segment contribute to overall revenue?</small> -Kitchen/meeting room rental -Sales commission -Revenue sharing -Training fees -Member fees -FEC incubation training -Network memb. -Sponsorships -Sales commission -Workshop fees -Consultancy services -Catering service		

Source: "Business Model Canvas Template." <https://www.strategyzer.com/canvas/business-model-canvas>.


Exhibits (cont.)

**Exhibit 6
Selected Statistics Summarizing Members
of the Köprü Entrepreneurship Incubation Program**



Exhibits (cont.)

Exhibit 6 (cont.)
Selected Statistics Summarizing Members
of the Köprü Entrepreneurship Incubation Program




Source: Created by the case author.

Exhibits (cont.)

Exhibit 7

FEC Commercial Kitchen Plan with Notes from Food Incubator Resource Partner



Source: Created by the case author.

Exhibits (cont.)

**Exhibit 8
FEC Design Renderings**

First Floor: Commercial kitchen and cafe



Second Floor: Coworking and offices



Exhibits (cont.)

**Exhibit 8 (cont.)
FEC Design Renderings**

Third Floor: Training and additional coworking space



Fourth Floor: Event spaces



Source: Case author.

Endnotes

- ¹ Çakır, Can, and Guler Kaya. "An Assessment on the Financial Inclusion of Syrian-owned Enterprises in Turkey." *Building Markets/Ingev*, Jan. 2020. https://buildingmarkets.org/sites/default/files/pdm_reports/an_assessment_on_the_financial_inclusion_of_syrian-owned_enterprises_in_turkey.pdf. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ² Erdem, Alper. "Social Cooperatives and Their Importance." *Erdem Legal*. 1 Mar. 2020. erdemlegal.com/en/social-cooperatives-and-their-importance/. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ³ "Figures at a Glance." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, 18 June 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ⁴ Devictor, Xavier, and Quy-Toan Do. "How Many Years Have Refugees Been in Exile?" *Population and Development Review*, vol. 43, no. 2, 2017, pp. 355-369. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26622897>. Accessed 30 Oct. 2020.
- ⁵ "Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, 18 June 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ⁶ "The struggle to restore Turkey's stricken economy." *The Economist*, 14 Mar. 2019. <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/03/14/the-struggle-to-restore-turkeys-stricken-economy>; "Turkey Unemployment Rate." *Trading Economics*. <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/unemployment-rate>. Both accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ⁷ Erdoğan, M. Murat. "Syrians Barometer 2019: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, July 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/syrians-barometer-2019-framework-achieving-social-cohesion-syrians-turkey-july-2020>. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ⁸ "Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions." *International Crisis Group*, 29 Jan. 2018. Report No. 248. <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-turkey-s-syrian-refugees.pdf#:~:text=International%20Crisis%20Group%20Europe%20Report%20N%C2%B0248%2029%20January,million%20internally%20displaced%20persons%20%28IDPs%29%20and%20about%20five>. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ⁹ "UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, Sept. 2018. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/66510>. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ¹⁰ "Turkish Food Retail Industry." *US Department of Agriculture*, 28 Feb. 2018. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Retail%20Foods_Ankara_Turkey_2-28-2018.pdf. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.
- ¹¹ "Turkish Food Retail Industry." *USDA Foreign Agriculture Service*, 28 Feb. 2018. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Retail%20Foods_Ankara_Turkey_2-28-2018.pdf. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020..
- ¹² Erdoğan, M. Murat. "Syrians Barometer 2019: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, July 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/syrians-barometer-2019-framework-achieving-social-cohesion-syrians-turkey-july-2020>. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.

Notes



Established at the University of Michigan in 1992, the **William Davidson Institute** (WDI) is an independent, non-profit research and educational organization focused on providing private-sector solutions in emerging markets. Through a unique structure that integrates research, field-based collaborations, education/training, publishing, and University of Michigan student opportunities, WDI creates long-term value for academic institutions, partner organizations, and donor agencies active in emerging markets. WDI also provides a forum for academics, policy makers, business leaders, and development experts to enhance their understanding of these economies. WDI is one of the few institutions of higher learning in the United States that is fully dedicated to understanding, testing, and implementing actionable, private-sector business models addressing the challenges and opportunities in emerging markets.